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In the first part of our analysis, we study how market participants perceive the central banks' communication ability, credibility, unorthodox measures, and independence. In the second part, we relate the last three aspects to the first, that is, central bank communication ability, and answer the following research question in light of the ongoing economic and financial crisis: Does central bank communication result in more positive perceptions of the bank's (i) credibility, (ii) unorthodox measures, and (iii) independence? Moreover, the paper contains a methodological innovation. To the best of our knowledge, and consistent with a literature review conducted by Blinder et al. (2008) , this is the first paper that studies central bank communication from a different angle.
Typically, the usefulness of central bank communication is evaluated by its (i) impact on financial markets (see the extensive survey by Blinder et al., 2008) , (ii) contribution to predicting future interest rate decisions (Jansen and de Haan, 2009; Hayo and Neuenkirch, 2010; Sturm and de Haan, 2011), or (iii) role in the monetary policy transmission process (Neuenkirch, 2013) . the effect of central bank communication on economic outcomes is likely more complex (see also Woodford, 2005) . Central bankers' crucial task is to influence the expectations of economic agents, which in turn will lead to changes in the economic outcome.
Therefore, we believe that Figure 2 is a more accurate description of the actual transmission process. The perception of communication, as represented in the middle box, is a crucial component of this process, the study of which is somewhat neglected in the literature. Thus, by studying economic agents' perceptions, this paper highlights some novel aspects of how central bank communication influences economic outcomes.
Central Bank Communication
Economic Outcome This paper also contributes to that branch of the finance literature that uses surveys of financial market participants to glean insight into, for example, information acquisition and trading behaviour (see, e.g., Shiller and Pound, 1989; Menkhoff, 1998; Cheung and Chinn, 2001; Oberlechner and Hocking, 2004; Menkhoff and Nikiforow, 2009 ). However, to the best of our knowledge, none of these papers study the perceptions of financial market participants in regard to central banks and their communications and actions.
The remainder of this paper is organised as follows. Section 2 introduces the survey and provides some descriptive statistics. Section 3 presents the empirical methodology. Section 4 discusses the empirical results of the survey. Section 5 concludes.
The Survey
The survey was conducted by Barclays Europe between 17 April and 1 May 2013. All subscribers to Barclay's fixed income newsletter were invited via e-mail to participate in an online survey. Our sample consists of 554 completed questionnaires. Respondents are from all over the world and work in different occupations and positions (see Table   A1 in the Appendix). Barclays also surveyed market participants in August 2007 and August 2008. However, very few of the questions from those surveys overlap with the current survey and the data have no panel structure. A general analysis of the recent round of survey data, targeted to Barclays' clients, can be found in Barclays (2013) .
In the following subsections, we introduce the subset of the survey questions relevant for this paper and discuss some descriptive results. Respondents were asked to answer these questions separately for four central banks: the Bank of England (BoE), the Bank of Japan (BoJ), the European Central Bank (ECB), and the Federal Reserve (Fed).
After completing the survey, respondents were given the opportunity to comment on the general theme of the survey, i.e., central bank communication. We occasionally refer to
Central Bank Communication
Perception by Financial Markets -Credibility -Independence -Unorthodox Measures Economic Outcome these comments, as they contribute some added depth to the answers to the structured questions; in a sense, taking the comments into consideration gives our predominantly quantitative analysis the added spice of a qualitative analysis.
Perception of Central Bank Communication in General
Q1: Please rank your overall sense of how well the BoE/BoJ/ECB/Fed communicates.
The answer scale for this question ranges from 1 (extremely poor) to 10 (extremely well). 1 Figure 3 summarises the distribution of answers and Table 1 provides some descriptive statistics. Moreover, the distribution of answers is left-skewed in the case of the Fed, whereas it is right-skewed in the case of the BoJ and BoE. The mean comparison tests summarised in Table 1 are additional support for the Fed's perceived communication ability. The Fed performs best, followed by the BoE, the BoJ, and the ECB.
As mentioned above, respondents were given the opportunity to make comments on the subject of the survey. One respondent's comment is a concise verbal description of the results given in Figure 3 : 'The Fed is the benchmark for communications from central banks. I think that the BoJ is especially bad at it, judging from the excessive market moves post their last announcement.' Another respondent remarked similarly: 'The two most useful communication tools are 1) clear and concise statements after EVERY meeting and 2) well written minutes. Fed is doing a good job on both accounts. BoE publishes very good minutes but not regular statements (I am puzzled why). The ECB statement and press conference is very useful but there are no minutes. BoJ still have an amazing ability to communicate in a convoluted manner, e.g., the last set of statements.' Thus, based on these comments, the ECB's failure to publish minutes, the BoE's failure to provide regular statements, and the BoJ's lack of clarity in its communications are at least some of the reasons why these banks received lower scores than the Fed. In the case of the ECB, there also appear to be structural reasons for why it is perceived as a less successful communicator than the Fed or the BoE. Respondent comments on this issue include: 'The ECB is hamstrung by its multinational character';
'ECB also has a good communication policy but many speakers'; 'The large number of ECB council members (all of whom have a vote) further obfuscates matters'; and 'The ECB is a quite young central bank. Their communication is good but must improve'.
However, since the ECB is a young, supranational institution, with a federally-organised decision-making process, short of completely remodelling its design, which is certainly unrealistic and perhaps even undesirable, there is not much that can be done about most of these perceived shortcomings.
However, other criticisms of the ECB could be addressed within the given It thus seems possible that the ECB could improve its communication, or at least the perception of it, by providing minutes, something that is apparently in the pipeline, and, more generally, becoming more transparent about its decision making and changing the language it uses, as well as the format of the information presented on its website.
Since the question about perception of central bank communication in general was also asked in the two previous rounds of Barclays' survey, we can compare the Again, the survey respondents' comments help us understand our quantitative results. For example, '[the] ECB is much less transparent than the Fed or BoE, and has become less so under Draghi despite regular press conferences'. Thus, at least one respondent believes that the worse communication has to do with the personal influence of a specific central bank president. However, we believe it is unlikely that this personal influence is sufficiently strong to explain the perceived loss of communication quality. It seems more likely to us that during the crisis, problems with the ECB's communications were much more obvious than they were during the 'Great Moderation'.
We find no significant evidence of a home bias in the perception of central bank communication abilities (columns 'Home' and 'Non-h.'). Finally, comparing means across different positional subgroups reveals that in the case of the ECB, analysts/economists have significantly more positive perceptions of the central bank's communication abilities than do people working in execution/trading positions.
Perception of Credibility
Q2: How well do you think the BoE/BoJ/ECB/Fed performs on credibility?
The answer scale for this question ranges from not well (1) to extremely well (4). Figure   4 summarises the distribution of answers and Table 2 provides some descriptive statistics. Notes: Coding: 1 = not well, 2 = fairly well, 3 = well, 4 = extremely well. Rank is determined by meancomparison tests with unequal variances and 1% level of significance. Exception: the difference between BoE and ECB is significant only at the 5% level. The 'Home' column shows means from respondents located in the home region of the respective central bank compared to those from the rest of the world ('Non-h.'). The columns labelled 'Econ.', 'Trad.', and 'P. Man.' display means across the largest positional subgroups 'analyst/economist', 'execution/trading', and 'portfolio/liability manager'. Significant differences across subgroups at the 5% level are indicated by bold figures.
Similar to the findings for Q1, we observe a left-skewed pattern in case of the Fed, whereas the distribution of answers is more balanced for the other three central banks.
The Fed is perceived as the most credible central bank, with 77% of respondents answering (extremely) well. A potential explanation is that the Fed's dual mandate gives it more discretion in monetary policy, and it therefore has more flexibility in deviating from the 2% inflation 'target' when such is necessary. The Fed's good rating suggests that, at least to some extent, financial market participants prefer discretion-based Table 2 shows that the BoE ranks second in terms of credibility, followed by the BoJ and the ECB. Although the idea that 'more transparency is better' currently dominates in the literature (see, e.g., Eijffinger and Geraats, 2006; Demertzis and Hughes Hallett, 2007; Hayo and Mazhar, 2014) , less transparency in monetary policy making also has its advantages (see, e.g., Cukierman and Meltzer, 1986; Sørensen, 1991; Grüner et al., 2009) . Indeed, central bank efforts to be highly transparent can have a sort of 'backfire' effect on credibility. As one respondents notes: 'Credibility dilemma: Central banks impact the market with surprising actions, but each surprise hurts credibility when all possible scenarios and paths have been made transparent. I believe central banks will be better off with less transparency. That way the banks can surprise the market without hurting credibility'.
Other comments further explain why the ECB is seen as less credible than the Fed. One participant wrote: 'Especially in the EMU, political influences have blurred the communication of the ECB and also caused a massive credibility loss in terms of crisis management'. As noted above, the ECB is relatively more heterogeneous than other central banks due to its supranational character. However, until recently, any disagreements between national representatives on the ECB's Governing Council were not directly observable (see Hayo and Méon, 2013) , which might explain why the earlier assessment of the ECB was more positive. However, the open dispute between ECB president Mario Draghi and the president of Bundesbank, Jens Weidmann, over unconventional monetary policy appears to have alerted market participants to the potential danger of national influences in the ECB, resulting in a loss of credibility.
Two things are of note when it comes to the ECB's level of credibility. First, the answers tend to be more extreme, i.e., have a higher variance, than in case of the other central banks and, second, there is a statistically significant home bias, that is, respondents living in Europe (excluding the UK) perceive the ECB as more credible than those living in the rest of the world.
This finding suggests that non-European market participants perceive the problems created by national influences in the ECB as more problematic than their European colleagues, who are more used to this type of supranational institutional design. Finally, BoE and the Fed are viewed as more credible by survey participants working in the fields of execution/trading than by portfolio/liability managers.
Satisfaction with Unorthodox Measures
Q3: Since the financial crises began, how satisfied are you with the BoE's/BoJ's/ECB's/Fed's unorthodox monetary policy measures (for instance, asset purchases, provision of exceptional liquidity, and conditional commitments on the future interest rate path)?
The answer scale for this questions ranges from extremely unsatisfied (1) to extremely satisfied (4). Figure 5 summarises the distribution of answers and Table 3 provides some descriptive statistics. Statistical tests confirm that the Fed takes first place, but fail to differentiate between the BoE and the BoJ for second place. Finally, we find no evidence of a home bias or for differences related to respondents' job positions.
(Non-)Deterioration of Independence
Q4: The monetary policy measures undertaken by the BoE/BoJ/ECB/Fed during the financial crises has reduced its independence.
The answer scale for this question ranges from strongly agreeing with the statement (1) to strongly disagreeing with the statement (5). Figure 6 summarises the distribution of answers and Table 4 provides some descriptive statistics. Figure 6 reveals a more differentiated picture than did the answers to the previous questions. Notes: Coding: 1 = strongly agree, 2 = agree, 3 = neither agree nor disagree, 4 = disagree, 5 = strongly disagree. Rank is determined by mean-comparison tests with unequal variances and 1% level of significance. Exception: the differences between BoE and Fed as well as between ECB and Fed are significant only at the 5% level. The 'Home' column shows means from respondents located in the home region of the respective central bank compared to those from the rest of the world ('Non-h.'). The columns labelled 'Econ.', 'Trad.', and 'P. Man.' display means across the largest positional subgroups 'analyst/economist', 'execution/trading', and 'portfolio/liability manager'. Significant differences across subgroups at the 5% level are indicated by bold figures.
Other Questions 2
Market participants were also asked two additional questions about more specific In the multivariate empirical analysis below, we also control for perceptions of how well the central banks convey their objectives.
Q7: How well do you think the BoE/BoJ/ECB/Fed performs on conveying its objectives?
Answers to Q7 show that market participants perceive the Fed as very successful in conveying its objectives; the other central banks do not perform nearly as well. In the case of the BoJ, respondents from execution/trading are significantly more positive in this respect than analysts/economists.
Finally, we ask for an evaluation of central bank predictability.
Q8: How well do you think the BoE/BoJ/ECB/Fed performs on predictability?
Results for Q8 show that the Fed is regarded as the most predictable central bank. We observe two significant differences across subgroups and regions. First, respondents working in execution/trading find the BoE, BoJ, and Fed more predictable than do portfolio/liability managers. Second, there is evidence of a positive home bias in case of the ECB, as participants living in Europe (excluding the UK) find the ECB to be more predictable than do those living in the rest of the world.
Empirical Methodology
Econometrically, we use ordered probit models to explain whether communication in general (Q1) is useful for the perception of our three left-hand side variables, (i) credibility (Q2), (ii) unconventional measures (Q3), and (iii) independence (Q4). Since all participants were asked the same questions for each of the four central banks, we can analyse our research questions in a quasi-panel setup. Table 5 .
Empirical Results

Perception of Credibility
Columns Pr(1) to Pr(4) show average marginal effects of the ordered probit model. A one unit increase in the communications rating of a central bank increases the probability that market participants perceive a central bank as highly credible by 5 percentage points (pp). This implies that a better perception of communications is almost as important as a one unit increase in the perceived (i) quality of unorthodox measures (6 pp), (ii) success in conveying objectives (7 pp), and (iii) degree of predictability (8 pp). In fact, statistical testing shows that only the latter value is significantly larger than that for the communication rating (Chi 2 (1) = 6.2*). 3 Finally, the conditional level of credibility is significantly higher for the ECB than for the BoE, whereas it is significantly lower for the BoJ. Coeff.
Pr (1) Pr (2) Pr (3) Pr (4) Table 7 .
Satisfaction with Unorthodox Measures
(Non-)Deterioration of Independence
We find that well-perceived central bank communication helps avoid the impression of deteriorating independence. A one unit increase in communication ability increases the probability of strongly disagreeing with the statement about deteriorating independence by 2 pp. The perception of unorthodox measures is significant only for the BoE and the Fed and leads to a higher likelihood, 4 pp and 3 pp, respectively, of strongly disagreeing with the statement. In the case of the ECB, disagreeing with the statement 'the monetary policy measures undertaken by the ECB during the financial crises has affected its ability to communicate with financial markets' is associated with a higher level of disagreement with the statement concerning independence (2 pp). Again, the influence of communication is found to be as important as that of the other explanatory variables in determining financial markets' impression of a key central bank characteristic. 5
Finally, as another part of our analysis, we attempt to explain the individual-fixed effects obtained from the final models in Tables 5-7 by the different occupations in which the survey participants work. However, only for perception of unorthodox measures do we find a significant difference at the 10% level. Participants in 'other'
occupations perceive the unorthodox measures as significantly worse than the reference group, 'analysts/economists'. Therefore, we do not find much evidence for notable conditional differences in the perception of central banks across respondents' occupations. 
Conclusions
In this paper, we provide an answer to the question of whether central bank communication has a positive effect on market participants' perception of (i) credibility, (ii) unorthodox measures, and (iii) independence. We also implement a methodological innovation, as this is the first paper to look at central bank communication from a different angle. Rather than relying on economic outcomes to evaluate the effectiveness of central bank communication, we use a large worldwide survey of financial market participants to shine some light into the black box of how central bank communication impacts economic outcomes.
In the first step of our investigation, we conduct an extensive descriptive analysis, which reveals several interesting findings. First, the overall rating of central bank communication is now worse than it was in 2007 and 2008. Second, the Fed is typically perceived as performing best in terms of communication ability, credibility, unorthodox measures, and independence. Typically, the BoE ranks second, followed by the ECB and the BoJ. Third, market participants tend to have more extreme views when it comes to the ECB than is the case for the other central banks. Fourth, we do not find much evidence of a home bias in the respondents' perception of central banks. Only in case of the ECB do we find that people living in Europe (excluding the UK) rate the central bank's credibility and predictability better than those living in the rest of the world.
In the second step of our analysis, we estimate ordered probit models to link behind the other central banks in certain areas, for instance, it introduced an inflation 'target' and regular press conferences after monetary policy decisions much later than did other central banks. Notes: Coding: 1 = not well, 2 = fairly well, 3 = well, 4 = extremely well. Rank is determined by meancomparison tests with unequal variances and 1% level of significance. The 'Home' column shows means from respondents located in the home region of the respective central bank compared to those from the rest of the world ('Non-h.'). The columns labelled 'Econ.', 'Trad.', and 'P. Man.' display means across the largest positional subgroups 'analyst/economist', 'execution/trading', and 'portfolio/liability manager'. Significant differences (at the 5% level) across subgroups are indicated by bold figures. Notes: Coding: 1 = not well, 2 = fairly well, 3 = well, 4 = extremely well. Rank is determined by meancomparison tests with unequal variances and 1% level of significance. The 'Home' column shows means from respondents located in the home region of the respective central bank compared to those from the rest of the world ('Non-h.'). The columns labelled 'Econ.', 'Trad.', and 'P. Man.' display means across the largest positional subgroups 'analyst/economist', 'execution/trading', and 'portfolio/liability manager'. Significant differences (at the 5% level) across subgroups are indicated by bold figures. 
